PROFESSIONALS IN BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS: APPOINTMENT, RIGHT TO
COMPENSATION AND CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST
William H. Gindin*
No servant can be the slave of two masters; for either he will
hate the first and love the second, or he will be devoted to the
first and think nothing of the second.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are few contexts in which application of the principle
articulated in the passage above is more fundamental than in the
area of participation by professionals in legal proceedings. In
particular, the notion that one man cannot serve opposing interests succinctly describes the view espoused by the draftsmen of
bankruptcy law.2 Professionals involved in bankruptcy proceedings quickly discover the Bankruptcy Code's (the Code) extensive
prohibitions when they seek to be retained in the case and are
denied approval on the basis of carefully articulated statutes,
which vigorously guard against conflicts of interest. 3 Unfortunately, professionals often learn about the Code's mandate later
in the case when they seek to recover fees and are denied them
because of the existence of a conflict.
This article endeavors to examine the law of appointments
and compensation of professionals in the bankruptcy forum. The
first portion will describe the role of the court in the appointment
process. The second will focus upon recent developments in the
* Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey.
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I Matthew 6:24.
2 Prior to the enactment of the modern Bankruptcy Code, compensation of
professionals was governed by § 221(4) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544
(1898), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), and by former Bankruptcy Rules 210 and 215. Several cases arising under the 1898 Act evidenced
apprehension over conflicts of interest, and highlighted the courts' desire to remove its taint from the bankruptcy forum early on in the development of this area
of the law. See, e.g., Woods v. City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268
(1941) (" 'reasonable compensation for services rendered' necessarily implies loyal
and disinterested service").
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(13), 327(a) (1988); FED. R. BANKR P. 2014.
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area of conflicts of interests in bankruptcy proceedings with an
emphasis on the issue of compensation.
II.

COURT AuTHORIZATION OF PROFESSIONALS

Pursuant to Section 327(a)4 of the Code, the trustee 5 must
obtain court approval of his selection of a "professional." '6 In
order to obtain the requisite approval, the trustee must follow
the procedures set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a), 7 which requires, among other things, that the application for employment
contain a detailed disclosure of the professional's connections
with the debtor, creditors and all other parties in interest.'
4 11 U.S.C. § 32 7 (a) (1988). The statute reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with
the court's approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants,
appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not hold
or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterestedpersons,
to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties
under this title.
Id. (emphasis added). See infra notes 36-82 and accompanying text.
5 Although § 327(a) only refers to the trustee's employment of a professional,
§ 1107 of the Code makes § 327 applicable to debtors in possession. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1107 (1988). Section 1107 states that "a debtor in possession shall have all the
rights ... and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties... of a trustee
serving in a case under this chapter." Id.
6 See, e.g., Dola Int'l Corp. v. Bordlemay (In re Dola Int'l Corp.), 88 Bankr. 950,
954 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (management consultants considered professional persons under § 327(a)); Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors v.
Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 60 Bankr. 612, 619-21 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (non-lawyer lobbyist not professional under § 327(a)); Frankfurth v.
Cummins (In re Cummins), 8 Bankr. 701, 702 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 15
Bankr. 893 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 20 Bankr. 652 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(real estate broker selling on commission is a "professional person").
7 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a) requires that:

An order approving the employment of attorneys, accountants,
appraisers, auctioneers, agents, or other professionals pursuant to
§ 327... of the Code shall be made only on application of the trustee
or committee, stating the specific facts showing the necessity for the
employment, the name of the person to be employed, the reasons for
the selection, the professional services to be rendered, any proposed
arrangement for compensation, and, to the best of the applicant's
knowledge, all of the person's connections with the debtor, creditor,
or any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants. The application shall be accompanied by a verified statement of
the person to be employed setting forth the person's connections with
the debtor, creditors, or any other party in interest, their respective
attorneys and accountants.
Id.
8 Professionals cannot meet the requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) by
merely stating, in a conclusory fashion, that the professional holds or represents no
interest adverse to the estate and is a disinterested person. In United States v.
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Should a professional fail to receive the requisite court approval
at the outset of the case, that professional may be left uncompensated. 9 Most courts will, however, grant professionals nunc pro
tunc, or retroactive, appointments under extraordinary or special
circumstances. 10

Because nunc pro tunc appointments are analyzed on a case by
Azevedo (In re Azevedo), 92 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988), an application was
submitted to the court that the court found to be insufficient because it repeated
the requirements of § 327(a) in conclusory language. The Azevedo court stated that
the verification
must touch all the bases and set forth in affirmative terms the professional's relationship with the debtor and with creditors and with any
other party in interest, and their respective attorneys and accountants.
Normally, all the bases will have been touched if, after the required
disclosures of any actual connections, the verification closes with the
statement: "Except as set forth above, I have no connection with the
debtor, creditors, or any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accounts." If the statement appears to be complete, raises
no concerns, and if the court has no reason to doubt its veracity, the
application normally will be approved.
Azevedo, 92 Bankr. at 911 (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P.
2014(a)).
9 The bankruptcy courts have broad discretion to deny compensation, or require disgorgement of funds, for failure to make full disclosure concerning disinterestedness. See, e.g. In re Willamette Timber Sys., Inc., 54 Bankr. 485, 489 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1985) (attorney not entitled to fees for period prior to entry of court's order
authorizing his appointment). See also Diamond Lumber, Inc. v. Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Diamond Lumber, Inc. (In re Diamond Lumber, Inc.), 88 Bankr.
773, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Guy Apple Masonry Contractor, Inc., 45
Bankr. 160, 163 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984); In re Coastal Equities, Inc., 39 Bankr. 304,
308 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984).
10 See infra notes 11-35 and accompanying text. See e.g., In re Rheam of Ind., Inc.,
Ill Bankr. 87, 94 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (court will only grant nunc pro tunc appointment when professional makes requisite showing of presence of extraordinary
circumstances); Okamoto v. THC Fin. Corp. (In re THC Fin. Corp.), 837 F.2d 389,
392 (9th Cir. 1988) (nunc pro tunc appointment only granted in limited circumstances where applicant shows both satisfactory explanation for failure to receive
timely court approval and that bankruptcy estate has been benefitted in significant
manner); In re Aladdin Petroleum Co., 85 Bankr. 738, 741 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)
(Bankruptcy Code militates against nunc pro tunc approval, absent showing of exceptional circumstances justifying failure to obtain pre-employment authorization);
Carlson v. Burns Nat'l Bank of Durango (In re Ewing), 54 Bankr. 952, 954-55
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (equity power to enter order for nunc pro tunc employment
should be exercised only in "most extraordinary circumstances"); Fanelli v. Hensley (In re Triangle Chem., Inc.), 697 F.2d 1280, 1289 (5th Cir. 1983) (bankruptcy
judge has discretion to enter order authorizing nunc pro tunc appointment of professional; however, the court noted that "[w]hile equitable powers may permit nunc
pro tunc appointment in rare or exceptional circumstances, we do not intend by our
holding to encourage any general nonobservance of the contemplated preemployment court approval"); In re BSJ Tower Assoc., 35 Bankr. 131, 133 (Bankr. D.P.R.
1983) (nunc pro tunc order of appointment may be issued in cases showing extraordinary circumstances).
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case basis, an overview of case law will shed some light on the
circumstances which must exist in order to justify such an appointment. " In In re FreeholdMusic Center, Inc. ,12 the president of
the corporate debtor sought to employ a small accounting firm. I s
During a meeting in which the attorneys for the debtors and the
accountants discussed the types of services to be rendered, the
attorneys advised the accountants that, due to internal problems
in the bankruptcy court, an order authorizing their retention
might be delayed. Although the accountants were advised that
the proper application would be prepared and submitted to the
court, authorization for the retention of the accountants was
never actually obtained. When informed that the court required
an order of retention as a prerequisite to payment, the accountants stopped working.
In an attempt to rectify the situation, the debtor filed an application seeking to retain the accountants nunc pro tunc and to
grant fees. In reviewing the application, the FreeholdMusic court
set forth the following test to determine whether a professional is
entitled to a nunc pro tunc appointment:
The rule which must be applied therefore is one in which
the [clourt balances the equities and exercises its discretion. It
must weigh the good faith of the professional in proceeding
without an order and take into account the response to information that the order has not been entered. It must further
determine the emergent need for the services rendered and
whether or not the debtors could have functioned without
such services. Other factors for consideration include a determination of whose responsibility it was to obtain authorization, the applicant's relationship with the debtors and his own
sophistication in the field. 4
Because the court found that the accountants proceeded in good
faith, that they performed services that were in the best interest of
the debtors, and that the debtors' business could not be properly
operated without the services of a qualified professional, the court
Although Freehold
authorized their employment nunc pro tunc."5
II It is important, however, to recognize that because there is no consensus on
what factors constitute a sufficient basis to grant nunc pro tunc appointments, the
determination is made on a case-by-case basis. See Land v. First Nat'l Bank in
Alamosa (In re Land), 116 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
12 49 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985).
'3

14

Id. at 294.
Id. at 296.

15 Id. In analyzing the issue, the FreeholdMusic court first rebutted Circuit Judge
Tate's characterization of the Third Circuit as a jurisdiction that applies a "strict
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Music was not appealed, uncertainty as to the grounds for nunc pro
tunc appointments brought the issue before the Third Circuit in In re
Arkansas Co. 16 In Arkansas, counsel for the Unsecured Creditors'
'inflexible per se rule' " against nunc pro tunc appointments. Id. at 295 (quoting In re
Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d 1280, 1285 (5th Cir. 1983)). Circuit Judge Tate
had identified the Third Circuit as employing a different standard than the other
Circuits. Id. In order to demonstrate that the Third Circuit allowed nunc pro tunc
appointments, the Freehold Music court distinguished the cases relied upon by CircuitJudge Tate, which were decided under the old Bankruptcy Act, and relied upon
two Third Circuit cases, which were decided under the modem Bankruptcy Code.
The first modem case that the Freehold Music court referred to was In re Lewis,
30 Bankr. 404 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983). In Lewis an attorney sought nunc pro tunc
appointment to recover fees for services rendered during the reorganization. Id. at
405. The Lewis court denied the application for employment nunc pro tunc, basing
its decision on In re Hydrocarbon Chem., Inc., 411 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969), which stood for the proposition that an attorney could
not be compensated by the Bankruptcy Court if he did not receive prior court approval for his employment. Lewis, 30 Bankr. at 405. With regard to nunc pro tunc
appointment, the Lewis court articulated "that both [the applicant] and the members of his firm are experienced practitioners in this field of law" and that the attorney "did not file his application for approval of employment until after this [c]ourt
had entered its show cause order." Id. at 405-06. The FreeholdMusic court, in interpreting the Lewis decision, noted that "[i]t is clear from [the Lewis court's] ruling
that the application was too little, too late and that the equity test required by Judge
Tate in Triangle Chemicals, [697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1983)], was not met." In re
Freehold Music, 49 Bankr. at 295.
The second case that the Freehold Music court referred to in its attempt to illustrate that the Third Circuit permitted nunc pro tunc appointment was In re Bible
Deliverance Evangelistic Church, 39 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). In this
matter, the attorneys for the creditors' committee sought compensation. Id. at 770.
The court, responding to the debtor's objection to compensating the attorneys because they had failed to obtain prior court approval, reasoned:
Ordinarily, we adhere to the strict rule enunciated in Lewis.
against nunc pro tunc fee awards. However, we believe counsel has
demonstrated the existence of exceptional circumstances during the
time period in question (March 29-April 12) requiring the immediate
attention of counsel for the creditors committee... It was necessary to
begin investigating the financial position of the debtor at once. Furthermore, counsel acted with reasonable promptness in filing its application for employment.
Id. at 772. Accordingly, this case, as relied upon by the Freehold Music court, evidences the fact that the Third Circuit permits nunc pro tunc appointment.
16 798 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1986). Although some of the bankruptcy courts in the
Third Circuit had exercised the power to grant retroactive approval, see In re Freehold Music Center, Inc., 49 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985); In re Bible Deliverance
Evangelistic Church, 39 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984), the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit had yet to determine whether the bankruptcy courts actually
possessed the power to grant retroactive approval to the employment of an attorney in chapter 11 proceedings. In determining that the bankruptcy court did have
the power to grant retroactive approval, the court reasoned that nothing in the
statute denied them the power to do so. In re Arkansas, 798 F.2d at 448. Therefore, the court expressed its agreement with those circuits which held that bankruptcy courts do have the power to authorize retroactive employment of
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Committee inadvertently failed to file an application for court approval of its employment as counsel. 7 After thirteen months of
rendering legal services to the Unsecured Creditors' Committee,
counsel realized that it had failed to obtain the court approval required for payment. In an effort to receive compensation for the
work it had performed, counsel moved the bankruptcy court to approve its employment retroactively. Although the bankruptcy court
denied the motion in an order without an opinion, a subsequent
hearing on the motion revealed that the bankruptcy judge believed
he lacked the authority to approve counsel's appointment nunc pro
tunc. 18
On appeal, the district court determined that the bankruptcy
court had incorrectly held that it was without power to grant approval nunc pro tunc.19 The court, however, affirmed the denial of
retroactive approval, observing that retroactive approval "should be
limited to cases in which the party seeking approval shows that it
would otherwise be subject to an extraordinary hardship not of its own
professionals. Id. at 648-49 (citing Cohen v. United States (In re Laurent Watch
Co.), 539 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Stolkin v. Nachman (In re Stolkin), 472 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1973)).
17 In re Arkansas, 798 F.2d at 646.
18 Judge Commisa believed that the Third Circuit's decision in In re Hydrocarbon Chem., Inc., 411 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1969) (in banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823
(1969), precluded him from granting nunc pro tunc appointments. Arkansas, 798
F.2d at 646. Although the Third Circuit in Hydrocarbon affirmed a denial of a counsel fee where counsel had failed to obtain prior court approval, the Arkansas court
viewed Hydrocarbon as easily distinguishable. Arkansas, 798 F.2d at 647.
In Hydrocarbon, the attorney seeking compensation was employed by counsel
for the debtor. In re Hydrocarbon, 411 F.2d at 204. The court,.in denying counsel
fees, stated that "[wie would deny compensation on the ground alone that there is
no provision in the Bankruptcy Act for paying more than one fee to counsel for the
debtor, nor is there any provision in the Act for employment of other counsel for
the counsel for the debtor unless he compensates them himself." Id. at 205. The
Hydrocarbon court also emphasized that a receiver was in place managing the property and had already appointed two law firms and an accountant to perform any
services that the estate needed. Id. Therefore, the court found that "there was no
necessity whatsoever for counsel of the debtor employing counsel without the approval of the court .... " Id. Accordingly, even a timely application would have
been denied in Hydrocarbon and, thus, there was no need for the court to discuss the
possibility of a nunc pro tune approval. Id. In short, the Hydrocarbon case has been
described as "one of those cases where some reason other than the failure to obtain
prior approval controlled the disallowance of payment of attorney's fees." Arkansas, 798 F.2d at 647 (citation omitted).
19 In re Arkansas, 55 Bankr. 384, 385 (D.N.J. 1985). The district court indicated
that, although the Third Circuit had never recognized the power to grant nunc pro
tunc appointment, it found the decision in In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc., 697 F.2d
1280 (5th Cir. 1983), to be persuasive. Therefore, it believed that there was discretion to grant nunc pro tunc appointment in rare or exceptional circumstances.
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making." 2 Counsel for the committee appealed again, and the
21
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling below.
The circuit court, however, softened the standard slightly when it
held that "nunc pro tunc approval should be limited to cases where
' 22
extraordinary circumstances are present.
The Third Circuit adopted a two-part test to determine whether
extraordinary circumstances exist. First, the bankruptcy court must
find, after a hearing, that the professional is disinterested and,
therefore, could have been appointed initially. 23 Second, the bankruptcy court must determine whether the circumstances in the case
excuse the professional's failure to have obtained prior approval.2 4
The Arkansas court established several factors to guide a consideration of whether the circumstances adequately excuse the failure to
obtain prior approval including, inter alia:
[W]hether the applicant or some other person bore responsibility for applying for approval; whether the applicant was
under time pressure to begin service without approval; 25 the
amount of delay after the applicant learned that initial approval had not been granted; 26 the extent to which compensation to the applicant will prejudice innocent third parties; and
other relevant factors.2 7
Arkansas, 55 Bankr. at 386 (emphasis added).
Arkansas, 798 F.2d at 651.
Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
Id. at 650.
Id.
See also F/S Airlease, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988) ("time pressure factor" relates to "whether there is sufficient time to request court approval before the professional's services must begin;"
for time pressure factor to be significant there must be an "emergency situation in
which services [must be] initiated within a very short period before approval [can]
be sought;" and approval must be sought promptly).
26 See also In re TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 93 Bankr. 875, 877 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988) (accounting firm's five month delay in seeking to amend bankruptcy
court order approving its appointment so that the appointment was retroactive to
date when firm first performed appraisal services prevented court from granting
nunc pro tunc appointment).
27 Arkansas, 798 F.2d at 650 (footnotes added); the courts have employed a variety of criteria in determining whether or not extraordinary circumstances exist. For
example, in In re Sinor, 87 Bankr. 620 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988), the court listed the
following criteria to determine whether to retroactively ratify a professional's
employ:
1. Did the employing entity expressly contract with the professional person to perform the services which were thereafter rendered?
2. Did the applicant provide sufficient notice of the application
to creditors and parties in interest and thus provide an opportunity
for filing objections?
3. But for the requirement of pre-employment approval, does
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Based upon this analytical framework, the circuit court affirmed the
holdings of both the bankruptcy and district courts by denying
counsel's application, and determined that oversight by an attorney
8
is not a sufficient ground for retroactive appointment. 2
The Third Circuit revisited the issue of nunc pro tunc appointments in F/S Airlease, Inc. v. Simon. 29 F/S Airlease involved a broker
for the debtor corporation who argued that he was entitled to nunc
pro tunc appointment or, in the alternative, that he was entitled to a
brokerage fee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). 30 In evaluating the brokers's argument for nunc pro tunc appointment under the
two part test set forth in Arkansas, the F/S Airlease court held that
no extraordinary circumstances existed. 3 ' Thus, the Third Circuit
determined that the broker was not entitled to nunc pro tunc
appointment.3 2
In rejecting the broker's alternative argument, that his services
the applicant otherwise meet the requirements of § 327(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a)?
4. If the "gap period" was unreasonably long, did the applicant
satisfactorily explain to the court the failure to obtain prior court approval?
5. Did the applicant's services benefit the estate in some significant manner?
Id. at 623.
28 Arkansas, 798 F.2d at 651.
29 844 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988).
30 d. at 108. Section 503(b)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part:
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses ... , including (1)(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for
services rendered after the commencement of the case[.]
11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1988).
31 F/S Airlease, 844 F.2d at 108.
32 Id. at 109. In denying nunc pro tunc appointment, the court focused upon two
factors "of particular relevance" set forth in Arkansas. Id. at 106. The first factor
concerned the issue of who bore responsibility for obtaining prior court approval
for employment of the professional. Id. The broker argued that he was not responsible because Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) provided that orders approving the
employment of professionals "shall be made only on application of the trustee or
committee." Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a)). The court, however, disagreed by observing that the broker still had the responsibility to ensure that the
approval had been sought. Id. at 106-07.
The second factor that the court analyzed was whether the applicant was under
any type of time pressure to begin services so that prior approval could not reasonably have been sought. Id. at 107. The Third Circuit Court disagreed with the two
lower courts which had found that the broker "operated under severe time pressures to locate another lessee for the aircraft." Id. The circuit court, in contrast,
held that the broker was not faced "with any time pressure at all with respect to
seeking court approval for his . . . services." F/S Airlease, 844 F.2d at 107.
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could be treated as a regular administrative expense, the court
stated that section 503(b)(1)(A) encompasses expenses for the protection and conservation of the estate, including repairs, upkeep,
rent and taxes.3 3 The court further observed that the authority to
pay administrative expenses for professionals is found not in section
503(b)(1)(A), but rather in section 503(b)(2)." a The court determined that because the broker was a professional and had failed to
seek prior court approval, he was not entitled to use any other sections of the Code to circumvent the requirements of section
327(a). 5
III.

THE Two-PRONGED TEST OF SECTION 327(a)

In addition to requiring court approval of the trustee's selection of a professional, section 327(a) imposes a two-pronged test
for determining whether a professional will qualify for employment. First, the professional is not permitted to "hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate" and, second, he must be a
"disinterested person[]. '" 6 If the professional fails to meet
either portion of the test, the court may deny compensation.3 7
Because the Code does not define "interest adverse to the
estate," the courts have interpreted that holding or representing
an interest adverse to the estate includes:
(1) ...[P]ossess[ing] or assert[ing] any economic interest that
33 F/S Airlease, 844 F.2d at 108.
34 Id. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1988) provides in pertinent part:

(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses ... , including (2) compensation and reimbursement awarded under section 330(a) of this title[.]
Id.
35 F/S Airlease, 844 F.2d at 108-09. See also In re Channel 2 Assoc., 88 Bankr. 351
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1988) (professional person whose employment was not approved
by bankruptcy court was not entitled to payment of compensation as an administrative expense); In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 65 Bankr. 446, 465-66 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1986) (professional services compensable from estate only if authorized
prior to performance).
36 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988).
37 11 U.S.C. 328(c) (1988), which provides, in relevant part:
[T]he court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed under
section 327 ... if, at any time during such professional person's em-

ployment ...,such professional person is not a disinterested person,
or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate
with respect to the matter on which such professional person is
employed.
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would tend to lessen the value of the bankruptcy estate or that
would create either an actual or potential dispute in which the
estate is a rival claimant; 38 or (2) ...possess[ing] a predispo-

sition under circumstances that render such a bias against the
estate.3 9
With respect to the second prong of the test, section 327(a) requires that the professional be disinterested. The Code defines a
disinterested person as one who "is not a creditor, 40 an equity se38 See also Parker v. Frazier (In re Freedom Solar Center, Inc.), 776 F.2d 14 (1st
Cir. 1985). The Parker debtor was a closely held corporation whose stock was held
entirely by its sole officer, Freeman. Id. at 15. Counsel for the debtor filed a voluntary chapter 7 liquidation petition, and Freeman simultaneously employed the same
counsel to represent him and a new corporation established to purchase the debtor
corporation's assets. The trustee requested that debtor's counsel withdraw from
representing Freeman and the new corporation because he would be representing
clients with opposing interests. Counsel refused to obey this request. The bankruptcy court found that there were two adverse interests between the debtor and
Freeman. Id. at 16. First, Freeman was interested in stalling the turnover of the
assets to the trustee, whereas the debtor corporation was willing to cooperate with
the trustee. Id. Second, Freeman would attempt to purchase the assets at the lowest price while the debtor would seek the highest price possible. Id. Based upon
these findings, the bankruptcy court observed that "when the sole shareholder
desires to purchase the estate's assets . . .adverse interests do result." Id. at 17
(citing In re Watson Seafood & Poultry Co., 40 Bankr. 436, 442 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1984)) (debtor's counsel fees denied where debtor's counsel represented the
debtor's controlling shareholder and a prospective purchaser of the estate). Accordingly, the bankruptcy court held that counsel could not represent both parties.
Id. at 15. When this matter reached the court of appeals, the First Circuit reinstated
the bankruptcy court's finding that debtor's counsel could not also represent the
debtor's sole shareholder who was seeking to purchase the debtor's assets. Id.
39 In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 827 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985). See also RogerJ. Au
& Son, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co. (In re Roger J. Au & Son, Inc.), 64 Bankr. 600, 604
(N.D. Ohio 1986) (quoting In re Roberts); In re O'Connor, 52 Bankr. 892, 96
(Bankr. W.D. Okla 1985) (quoting In re Roberts).
40 Although section 101 (13)(A) states that a creditor may not be considered to
be a disinterested person, not all courts are willing to apply a per se rule that would
disqualify attorneys for holding a security interest in an estate. In Michel v. Carter
(In re Carter), 116 Bankr. 123, 125 (E.D. Wis. 1990), the debtor assigned its interest
in a land contract to a law firm as collateral for payment of legal fees for services to
be rendered in the future. Id. The Untied States Trustee objected to the firm representing the debtor on the ground that the firm was not a disinterested person
since the prepetition assignment caused the firm to become a creditor of the estate.
Id. at 125.
In analyzing the United States Trustee's position, the district court focused
upon the language of the Bankruptcy Code. First, Senior District Judge Reynolds
noted that the Code "defines creditor as 'an entity that has a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor.' " Id. (quoting I U.S.C. § 101(9)(A)). Further, the court contended that
"claim" is defined by the Code as the "right to payment, whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Id. (quoting I U.S.C. § 101(4)(A)). Although the court found that the firm was a creditor
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curity holder or an insider ' 4' and one who "does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of
creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to... the debtor.., or for any other reason."'42 A
comparison of section 32 7 (a) and section 101(13) indicates that to
"hold ...an interest adverse to the estate" in section 327(a) and to
"have an interest materially adverse to the estate" in section
101(13) are identical considerations. Consequently, according to
the Code's definition of the term, by being a "disinterested person"
one automatically satisfies both prongs of the test.43
Although the definitions mentioned above may shed some light
because it had a right to payment contingent upon its performing legal services for
the debtors during the bankruptcy proceedings, it refused to apply the per se rule
offered by the United States Trustee which would automatically disqualify an attorney from representing a debtor once the attorney is determined to be a creditor.
Id. at 126-27.
The district court first noted that the circuits were split as to the validity of the
rule offered by the United States Trustee. Id. at 126. Judge Reynolds explained
that the Eighth Circuit in the case of Pierce v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (In re Pierce), 809
F.2d 1356, 1362-63 (8th Cir. 1987), adopted the type of per se rule advocated by
the United States Trustee. Michel, 116 Bankr. at 126. The Pierce court held that the
statute's intent was clear and that a professional who is a creditor does not qualify
as a disinterested person under 11 U.S.C. § 101(13). Pierce, 809 F.2d at 1362-63.
Next, the district judge observed that the First Circuit, in In re Martin, 817 F.2d
175, 183 (1st Cir. 1987), adopted the contrary position. Michel, 116 Bankr. at 126.
The Martin court eschewed "the affixation of pejorative labels to the kind of mortgage arrangement entered into between the debtors and [the law firm]," and declared that it was "not prepared to say across the board that a retainer of this type is
good--or bad-in every instance." Martin 817 F.2d at 181.
After reviewing both positions, the Michel court found the view set forth by the
First Circuit persuasive. Michel, 116 Bankr. at 126. Therefore, the court concluded
that a professional who fits the Code's definition of "creditor" is not automatically
disqualified on that basis. Id. at 126-27. Finally, the court held that counsel had
satisfied the requirement of disinterestedness. Id. at 127.
41 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(A) (1988) (footnote added).
42 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E) (1988). The bankruptcy courts often cite to COLLIER's
discussion of this Code section:
It appears broad enough to include anyone who in the slightest degree might have some interest or relationship that would color the
independent and impartial attitude required by the Code .... Indirect or remote associations or affiliations, as well as direct, may engender conflicting loyalties. The purpose of the rule is to prevent
even the emergence of a conflict irrespective of the integrity of the
person under consideration.
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 327.03, at 327-30 to 327-32 (15th ed. 1990) (citations
omitted) (hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY).
43 E.g., Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., (In re Roger J. Au & Sons,
Inc.), 64 Bankr. 600, 604 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) ("both prongs of the test are
satisfied where counsel is . ..a 'disinterested person' because of the manner in
which the Code defines 'disinterested person' ").
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on the requirements for employment as a professional, an examination of case law that has applied section 327 will help to emphasize
the role it plays with respect to employment and compensation of
professionals. In reviewing the cases that follow, it is important to
keep in mind that the courts sought to determine whether the professional was "free of any conflicting interest which might ...affect
the performance of [his or her] services or which might impair the
high degree of impartiality and detached judgment expected ...
during the administration of the case." 4 4 If a court finds that the
professional has a conflict of interest, the professional will not be
employed or compensated. Therefore, it is useful to examine the
most common circumstances in which courts have determined that
the professional chosen is not sufficiently free from conflicts.
A.

Representation of Two Debtors in Possession

One situation in which the bankruptcy courts have determined that a professional cannot qualify as a disinterested person
arises in the context of representation of related debtors in possession, where one of the debtors has a claim against the estate of
the other debtor.4 5 This situation arose in In re Star Broadcasting,
Id. (citing COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY, supra note 42, 327.03[3][a], at 327-13.
When disqualifying a professional from representing two debtors in possession, an emphasis is placed on the fact that one of the debtors is indebted to the
other. For example, in In re Vanderbilt Assoc., 117 Bankr. 678 (D. Utah 1990), the
court did not disqualify a law firm that represented two related debtors in possession, where neither of the debtors in possession owed any obligations or had any
adverse relationships with the other. Id. at 680. The facts of the case reveal, however, that they did have a relationship with one another in that they shared a common general partner.
Although the bankruptcy court found that two conflicts existed with such an
arrangement, the district court did not agree. Id. at 681. First, it disputed the
bankruptcy court's finding that a conflict existed because either one of the debtors
could assert a claim against the general partner. Id. The bankruptcy court reasoned that under chapter 7, the trustee may assert claims "against the general partner if the general partner is personally liable." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 723(a)). If
one of the debtors asserted a claim, the bankruptcy court posited, a conflict would
exist because it would reduce the general partner's assets available to service the
remaining debtor. The district court found fault in this legal conclusion, however,
because § 723, the section relied on by the bankruptcy court for the apparent conflict, applies solely to chapter 7 cases. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988)). The
district court found that no conflict existed because the present case was under
chapter 11. Id.
Second, the district court overturned the bankruptcy court's finding that a conflict existed with respect to each debtor's plan of reorganization. Id. at 681-82.
The bankruptcy court noted that the plans called for equity contributions by the
limited partners, and if more money was needed, the general partner would make
up the difference. Id. at 682. With this type of arrangement, the bankruptcy court
held that if the general partner gave money to one of the estates, the other estate
44
45
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Inc. ,46 where a law firm moved for an order declaring that its representation of both the debtor corporation and its sole owner did
not represent a conflict of interest.
In 1986, both Sandra M. Shenfeld (Shenfeld) and Star
Broadcasting, Inc. (SBI), a corporation wholly-owned by
Shenfeld, filed chapter 11 petitions for reorganization. In 1987,
Shenfeld and SBI discharged their original counsel and obtained
court orders authorizing the substitution of Cole, Schotz, Bernstein, Meisel & Forman (Cole, Schotz) as counsel for both debtors in possession. A few months after the court approved the
representation by Cole, Schotz, several creditors opposed the
continued dual representation of both debtors in possession,
based upon alleged conflicts of interests between the two debtor
estates.47
The court, focusing primarily upon the fact that Shenfeld
was an unsecured creditor of SBI, determined that an actual conflict existed.4 8 Judge Gambardella reasoned that, although
Shenfeld proposed to waive her claims against SBI for monies
loaned to the corporation, the representation of both parties
would be in direct conflict. 4 9 The bankruptcy judge concluded:
would be prejudiced because the amount of money available to the second debtor
would be depleted. Id. This fact, combined with the fact that the same law firm
represented both debtors, caused the bankruptcy court to find a conflict in the dual
representation. Id. Although conceding that the plans did call for such a contingency, the district court reasoned that it was merely a potential conflict, rather than
an actual conflict. Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court did not disqualify
counsel because it determined that a potential conflict was an insufficient ground
for disqualification. Id. Contra In re Oliver's Stores, 79 Bankr. 585, 594 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1987) (potential conflict of interest may be enough to disqualify an attorney
from representation); In re BH&P, Inc., 103 Bankr. 556, 563-64 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1989) (courts should treat actual and potential conflicts similarly), rev'd on other
grounds, 119 Bankr. 35 (D.N.J. 1990).
46 81 Bankr. 835, 836 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988).
47 Id. at 837.
48 Id. at 841.
49 Id. The court distinguished the case of In re Guy Apple Masonry Contractor,
Inc., 45 Bankr. 160 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984), which was offered by Shenfeld and SBI
in support of their position. Star Broadcasting, 81 Bankr. at 842. In Guy Apple, a law
firm represented both Guy Apple in a chapter 11 proceeding and one of its debtors,
University Block, in another chapter 11 proceeding. 45 Bankr. at 164. University
Block owed Guy Apple both a large prepetition debt and an undetermined amount
for rent incurred as an administrative expense during the proceedings. Id. at 165.
Although the bankruptcy court found that an actual conflict of interest existed due
to the inter-company unsecured and administrative claims, it focused primarily on
whether the conflict was materially adverse to the estate, creditors, or equity security holders. Id. at 166. In finding that the firm's representation of both debtors was
not materially adverse to the estate, the Guy Apple court opined:
The [c]ourt simply finds that at this late stage continued representa-
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if Shenfeld waives her claims against SBI, her estate is lessened in value from which her creditors may collect and SBI's
estate is increased in value since they would not have to pay
Shenfeld her purported claim. Conversely, if Shenfeld does
not waive her claim against SBI and succeeds in collection
thereof, her estate is enhanced and SBI's estate is lessened.5 °
Applying this reasoning, the court held that, by representing both
SBI as a debtor in possession and Shenfeld as a debtor in possession
and a creditor of SBI, Cole, Schotz disqualified itself due to the conflict of interest.5" Therefore, counsel could not be employed by
both debtors.5 2
tion of the debtor by present counsel would be in the best interests of
the estate. The major issues remaining to be resolved relate to the
amount and priority of various claims from debtor's attempted rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. Present counsel is intimately familiar with these issues and the background necessary to
debtor's effective assertion of its position. It would be both counterproductive and unduly expensive at this point to require new counsel
to become familiar with these files.
Id. at 167. The Star Broadcasting court distinguished Guy Apple based upon this
passage because it found that "the court in Guy Apple was more concerned with the
effects of disqualification on the estate given the facts of [the] case." Star Broadcasting, 81 Bankr. at 843.
50 Star Broadcasting, 81 Bankr. at 841.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 844. See also In re Hoffman, 53 Bankr. 564 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985). In
Hoffman, the corporate debtor in possession was in the farming business, holding
assets of approximately $800,000 and liabilities of approximately $3,000,000. Id. at
564. The debtor was a closely-held corporation which was owned equally by both
Charles L. Hoffman (Hoffman) and L. Craig Shackelford (Shackelford). Id. Hoffman was an unsecured creditor for approximately $240,000 and also had a contingent claim, with Shackelford, for $1,150,000. Id. Shackelford held the contingent
claim and a noncontingent unsecured claim of approximately $330,000. Id. Shackelford was a chapter 11 debtor in possession in his own reorganization case, while
Hoffman was a debtor in a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. Id. The same law firm
represented all three parties in both prepetition and postpetition proceedings. Id.
at 564. A bank creditor objected to the law firm's representation of all three parties. Id. at 564.
The court held that counsel may represent the corporate debtor in possession
and at the same time represent the chapter 7 debtor. Id. at 565. The court reasoned that the attorneys could represent an adverse interest in the chapter 7 case
because they did not represent the estate, were not required to be disinterested,
and did not require court approval to represent the chapter 7 debtor. Id. (citations
omitted).
The court, however, determined that the same counsel could not represent
both the corporate debtor in possession and the chapter 11 debtor. Id. at 566. The
court reasoned that "[t]he creditors in each case have an interest in being paid.
Where one estate is indebted to the other, there exist two groups of creditors which
have conflicting claims and payment for one group is necessarily at the expense of
the other." Id. The court then posited that a conflict of interest inherently exists in
a chapter 11 proceeding "if counsel simultaneously represent[s] a chapter 11 cor-
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Representation of Debtor and its Creditors

Another situation in which a court would disqualify a professional and refuse compensation arises where the professional
presently 53 represents both a debtor and its creditors. This situation arose in In re BH & P,Inc.54 In this proceeding the debtor
corporation, BH&P, initially filed a chapter 11 petition.55 Later,
the case was converted to chapter 7 and a trustee, Carmen J.
Maggio (Maggio), was appointed. Pursuant to a court order, the
trustee retained Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin (Ravin, Greenberg)
as counsel and Bederson & Co. (Bederson) as accountants.
Subsequently, two principals of BH&P also filed chapter 7
petitions. The same trustee was appointed in these proceedings,
without the knowledge of the bankruptcy court,5 6 and Ravin,
Greenberg and Bederson again served as attorney and accountant, respectively. Not until after Maggio filed a motion for joint
administration did the bankruptcy court learn that the trustee
and the professionals represented all three estates. 57 The bankruptcy court further discovered that the trustee knew from the
porate debtor in possession, and an individual equity security holder who is also a
debtor in possession and who is also a creditor of the debtor corporation in a pending chapter 11 case .... Id. (citing In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815 (Bankr. D. Utah
1985); In re Watson Seafood & Poultry Co., 40 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984);
In re WPMK, Inc., 42 Bankr. 157 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1984); In re Chou-Chen Chem.,
Inc., 31 Bankr. 842 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 20
Bankr. 295 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re King Resources Co., 20 Bankr. 191 (D.
Colo. 1982); In re 765 Assoc., 14 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1981); Barton v.
Chrysler (In re Paine), 14 Bankr. 272 (W.D. Mich. 1981)).
53 Courts have also denied fees where an attorney previously represented the opposing interest in connection with the bankruptcy proceeding. See In re South Pacific Island Airways, 68 Bankr. 574, 578 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986) (attorney denied all
fees and costs relating to representation of creditors' committee where attorney
formerly represented debtor). But see In re Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local
Union 107, 86 Bankr. 404 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (attorney and firm as counsel to
creditors not disqualified where debtor consulted with attorney before he joined
the firm about possibility of filing bankruptcy due to limited nature of consultation
between attorney and debtor); In re Flanigan's Enters., Inc., 70 Bankr. 248, 253
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (debtor's law firm not disqualified on ground of conflict of
interest although members of firm had previously been associated with firm which
represented creditor on prior matters with debtor, where there was no showing that
debtor's legal representation in any way prejudiced creditor).
54 103 Bankr. 556 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 119 Bankr. 35
(D.N.J. 1990).
55 Id. at 558.
56 The Bankruptcy court did not have knowledge that Maggio was appointed as
trustee for all estates because, at the time the situation arose, the various cases were
assigned to different judges. The Bankruptcy Rules require notice to the court of
the acceptance of appointment as a chapter 7 trustee. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2008.
57 In re BH&P, 103 Bankr. at 559.
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outset of the two subsequent cases that BH&P had claims against
the individual debtors.5 8
In determining whether the payment of fees was proper, the
court focused upon whether the trustee and the professionals
were properly disinterested as required by the Code. 59 First, the
bankruptcy court analyzed the appointment of the same trustee
in all three proceedings.6" Bankruptcy Judge Stripp maintained
that in order to be appointed, the chapter 7 trustee had to be a
"disinterested person" in each of the cases. 6 In determining
that the trustee was not disinterested as to the estates of the principals of BH&P, Judge Stripp reasoned as follows:
"Creditor" is defined by Code § 101(9)(A) as an entity
that has a claim against the debtor that arose at or before the
order for relief.... "Claim" is defined by Code § 101(4) as a
right to payment of any nature. A bankruptcy trustee is the
representative of the debtor's estate by virtue of Code
§ 323(a), with the capacity to sue and be sued. If an estate
holds a claim against another person, such claim is an asset of
the estate under Code § 541 (a) (1), and the trustee is the person who holds it as the estate's representative and is authorized to prosecute it. A trustee of an estate which holds a claim
against another estate is therefore a "creditor" of the latter
estate as defined by Code § 101 (9). If a trustee is a creditor of
an estate, he or she is not a disinterested person as to that
estate by virtue of Code § 101(13)(A). It follows that because
Maggio is trustee of BH&P, he is not a disinterested person
within the meaning of Code § 101(13)(A) as to the estates of
[the principals] because he holds claims against those
estates 62
Relying on the fact the trustee was representing a creditor of the
individual debtors' estates, the court concluded that the trustee,
Maggio, could not serve as trustee for the estates of the principals.6"
58 Id. One of the claims was "for transfers from BH&P within a year of its bankruptcy petition of approximately $1.7 million into seven real estate tax shelters of
which [the two principals] were the sole limited partners." Id.
59 Id. at 560-61.
60

61
62

Id. at 561.
Id. at 560.

Id. at 561 (citation omitted).
Id. Cf. Hassett v. McColley (In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc.), 16 Bankr. 932
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. (O.P.M.) was a whollyowned subsidiary of Cali Trading International, Ltd. (Cali). James Hassett (Hassett) was appointed trustee when O.P.M. filed a petition for relief under chapter 11.
Id. at 935. As trustee for O.P.M., Hassett filed an involuntary petition under chapter 11 against Cali, and an order for relief was entered. Id. at 936. Hassett then
moved for appointment of a trustee for Cali, and an order for relief was granted.
63
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Next the court focused upon each of the professionals and utilized section 327(c),6 4 which mandates disapproval of a professional's employment where there is an "actual conflict of interest."6 5
Id. Hassett was selected by the United States Trustee to represent the estate of
Cali, and the court was alerted that there was a potential for conflict. Id. The
United States Trustee, however, noted that Hassett was a proper choice and if any
actual conflict arose in the future it could be dealt with at that time. Id. On these
facts the court approved Hassett as Cali's trustee. Id. at 938.
Albert Reisman, the chapter 7 trustee of one of Cali's two shareholders, asserted two reasons why Hassett and his attorneys should have been removed from
the representation of Cali. Id. at 936. First, O.P.M. had claims against Cali for
$134,153.98. Id. Second, and most significantly, Hassett, on behalf of both estates,
filed suit to recover certain shares of bank stock. Id. Hassett believed that this bank
stock was owned by either O.P.M. or Cali, and Reisman alleged that a conflict
would arise if Hassett was successful in recovering this stock. Id.
The bankruptcy court, citing several Second Circuit decisions, held that a conflict does not arise where Hassett, as O.P.M.'s trustee, was a creditor of Cali. Id. at
938-39 (citations omitted). Further, the court held that no conflict existed with
respect to the bank stock unless Hassett actually succeeded in recovering it. Id. at
939. Additionally, even if Hassett did recover the stock, Bankruptcy Judge Lifland
posited that proper case management could avoid any conflict. Id. at 940. For
these reasons, the bankruptcy court chose not to remove Hassett and his attorneys
from representing the Cali estate. Id.
Although the outcome in O.P.M. Leasing is contrary to the outcome in In re
BH&P, one might postulate that the cases are consistent with one another. In
0. P.M. Leasing, Judge Lifland specifically found that full disclosure had been made
to the court and that no actual conflicts existed. In In re BH&P, however, the corporation had actual claims against the individuals. Further, in O.P.M. Leasing, the
situation arose early in the case. In comparison, it occurred at the end of the case
in In re BH&P. Accordingly, one might argue that, in actuality, the outcome of
these cases parallel one another.
64 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988) provides in full:
In a case under chapter 7, 12, or 11 of this title, a person is not
disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such
person's employment by or representation of a creditor, unless there
is objection by another creditor or the United States trustee, in which
case the court shall disapprove such employment if there is an actual
conflict of interest.
Id.
65 In re BH&P, 103 Bankr. at 562. Judge Stripp set forth the following analysis
as to why actual and potential conflicts of interest should be treated similarly even
though § 327(c) expressly prohibits only actual conflicts of interest:
The terms "actual" and "potential" conflict merely describe different stages in the same relationship. As previously noted, an actual
conflict can be defined as an active competition between two interests,
in which one interest can only be served at the expense of the other.
A potential conflict can then be defined as one in which the competition is presently dormant, but may become active if certain contingencies occur.
Id. at 563.
With this definition in mind, Judge Stripp advanced two special reasons why
such actual and potential conflicts should be treated similarly. First, the judge posited that even where a conflict is potential, the fact that there is a possibility of
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Applying section 327(c) to Bederson, Judge Stripp ruled that counsel must be disqualified.6 6 The bankruptcy judge found that Bederson's duties in all three cases included the investigation of irregular
transfers and potential causes of action. Accordingly, the judge
charged that it would be difficult for an accountant employed for
such reasons to remain objective as to all three estates because a
possibility existed that Bederson would be called to testify for both
sides in support of their respective positions.6 7
Subsequently, the court addressed the representation of the
Ravin, Greenberg firm. In reviewing the duties of Ravin, Greenberg, Judge Stripp again determined that disqualification was
proper because counsel would have to "assert claims on behalf of
Maggio as trustee of BH&P, [and] against Maggio as trustee of [the
principals]." 68 Moreover, a possibility existed that the estates of the
principals would assert claims against each other, or against BH&P,
and Ravin, Greenberg would be left to defend opposing sides. 69
In short, the court concluded that "where an attorney or accountant for a trustee also represents or is employed by a creditor,"
the professional involved has a conflict of interest. 70 Consequently,
the professionals were removed as attorney and accountant for the
trustee in the principals' cases. 7 '
future active competition is enough to affect the manner in which events develop.
Id. at 564. Judge Stripp stated that "the existence of a 'potential' conflict can
change circumstances so that the deck is stacked by the time the conflict becomes
'actual.' " Id. at 564. Second, the bankruptcy judge expressed the concern that a
court would be faced with delay when a potential conflict becomes actual because
the trustee or professionals would have to be disqualified in midstream. Id. The
court opined that serious problems could have been avoided if a professional without a potential conflict would have been employed in the first instance. Based upon
this rationale, the court chose to disapprove employment of a professional where a
potential conflict exists, notwithstanding an awareness that section 327(c) only refers to actual conflicts. Id.
66 Id. at 566.
67 Id. at 565.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 566.
71 Id. See alo In re Lee Way Holding Co., 100 Bankr. 950 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1989) (counsel for chapter I debtor was disqualified and had to disgorge fees
where counsel was involved in representation of major creditor both pre-petition
and after appointment as debtor's counsel); In re Status Game Corp., 102 Bankr. 19
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (prior and current representation of debtor's principal secured creditor appeared as conflict of interest and resulted in disqualification of
counsel who served as debtor's attorney); In re Sixth Ave. Car Care Center, 81
Bankr. 628, 631 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (counsel for debtor in possession precluded because law firm also represented parties that "stand in the shoes of the
secured creditor and it is difficult for the court to understand how an attorney could
represent both the principal secured creditor and the debtor in possession"); In re
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C. Representation of Creditors' Committee and its Individual Members
The final situation to be analyzed arises when counsel to the
creditors' committee simultaneously represents some of the individual members of the committee. In 1987, Judge Tuohey grap72
pled with this type of representation in In re Oliver's Stores, Inc.
In Oliver's, individual members of the Unsecured Creditors' Committee (Committee) requested that the counsel retained by the
Committee file a law suit against the debtor's former accountants.73 Essentially, Judge Tuohey determined whether section
1103(b)7 1 precluded the attorney from representing members of
the Committee in their individual capacity. 75 While Judge
Tuohey conceded that section 1103(b) does not have a per se
rule proscribing the representation of both the Committee and
an individual creditor, he perceived a need to take a cautious approach by disqualifying a professional where a potential conflict
existed.76
To emphasize his point, Judge Tuohey indicated that the
standard governing conflicts of interest for counsel representing
creditors' committees is a rigid one.7 7 The judge stressed that
"the integrity of the bankruptcy system demands that the professionals serving the committee not place themselves in a situation
where their independence, loyalty and integrity can be ques' 78
tioned by the unsecured creditor body whom they represent.
Based upon this rationale, the court refused to authorize the dual
Michigan Gen'l Corp., 78 Bankr. 479 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (counsel disqualified
because counsel represented various affiliated debtors which put law firm in position of representing both creditors and debtors in the same case).
72 79 Bankr. 588 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987).
73 Id. at 590.
74 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1988) provides:
(b) An attorney or accountant employed to represent a committee...
may not, while employed by such committee, represent any other entity having an adverse interest in connection with the case. Representation of one or more creditors of the same class as represented by the
committee shall not per se constitute the representation of an adverse
interest.
Id.
75 79 Bankr. at 592.
76 Id. at 595. See also In re Levy, 54 Bankr. 805, 808 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (attorney retained by creditors' committee can represent others with parallel interest
but prohibited if there is actual conflict of interest); In re Grant Broadcasting of
Philadelphia, 71 Bankr. 655 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (prohibition if counsel represents an individual creditor and creditors' committee where hired by individual to
litigate potentially adverse issues to other committee members).
77 In re Oliver's Stores, 79 B.R. at 597.
78 Id.
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representation.79 Judge Tuohey reasoned that it was the professional's duty to maximize the recovery for the Committee, and an
action brought against the debtor's accounting firm could result
in the accounting firm's seeking indemnification or contribution
from the debtor or its blameworthy officers."0 Once the debtor
corporation became a party to the lawsuit, the Oliver's Stores court
recognized that the professionals would be in the position of representing an adverse interest because the debtor's chance of being exposed to a large claim would, in effect, result in a
significant diminution of the balance available to the Committee. 8 1 Accordingly, Judge Tuohey concluded that counsel for the
committee could not represent individual creditors.82
IV.

CONCLUSION

A careful examination of the cases discussed in this article,
with reference made to the dates of the various opinions, suggests a trend toward a much more rigid imposition of the rules of
conflict. Years ago, people dealt with one another on the assumption that a lawyer could bring objectivity to a matter, and
need not consult with one client about representation of another
client. Today, the court is continually concerned with conflicts
both actual and potential. The question, of course, is where this
trend leads us in the field of bankruptcy.
In the first place, it has become exceedingly difficult for an
attorney to represent creditors as well as debtors, for whether
that attorney represents a creditor in a particular case or not, the
debtor may be indebted to a former client of that attorney. For
example, in this era of large banks, if an attorney once represents
a bank, the possibility of subsequently being asked to represent a
debtor indebted to that bank looms large. Banks, of course, are
in a position to take advantage of this circumstance, and by
spreading their work around, limit the ability of any firm to represent creditors as well as debtors.
Even where a firm limits its practice to creditors, the same
problem exists. If the attorney has ever represented Bank A and
is asked to represent Bank B in a given case, it could turn out that
it is in the interest of Bank B that a lien held by Bank A (repre79

Id.

80 Id. (citing H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 NJ. 324, 350 (1983)).
81 Id. at 596.
82 Id. at 597.
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sented by another attorney) may, in fact, be the subject of an attack. The attorney is caught in an impossible situation.
With respect to law firms themselves, the larger the firm the
broader the client base. The broader the client base, the greater
the likelihood that a simple conflict search will turn something
up. Superimposed upon this is the recent trend, particularly in
the larger cities, where units of firms move from one firm to another. Thus, the bankruptcy department of firm A may move to
firm B and in so doing develop a whole new area of conflicts of
interest.
The implications of this trend merit concern. The first and
most obvious problem is that as specific clients and the public in
general become more sophisticated, less cowed by the majesty of
the legal profession and more demanding of total loyalty, clients
will require the full and absolute loyalty of attorneys. If a debtor
names a particular bank as one of its creditors, that bank will be
likely to refuse to waive the conflict if they are willing to have
another attorney handle the matter.
This has severe economic implications for the practice of
law, for the answer lies only in the development of sub-specialties. The future may well hold a prospect that firms will represent only debtors, or only trustees, or only creditors committees.
When it comes to representing secured creditors, they may only
be able to represent one bank. If that bank does not supply sufficient business, the firm is put in a difficult position. There may
be advantages to this in terms of client loyalty or the vigor of
counsel's representation, but it may also place great limitations
upon the ability of the lawyer to gain a broad view of any given
field. A creditors committee lawyer who has represented a
debtor in another case may understand the problems involved in
that type of representation far better than one who has done
nothing but represent creditors committees. By the same token,
a lawyer representing a secured creditor is better off if he has had
experience representing trustees.
Former Judge Arlin Adams addressed the issue in a recent
article.83 Judge Adams decried the loss of the lawyer as a public
servant and urged that the lawyer serve the public interest by exercising independence both from their business community and
from their clients. Clearly, the narrow approach to conflicts inhibits the lawyer in his or her exercise of such independence. If a
83 Adams, The Legal Profession: A Critical Evaluation, 74 J. AM.
77 (1990).
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secured creditor can, for practical purposes, direct that an attorney represent only other secured creditors who never have a conflict with the first secured creditor, the lawyers will not have the
breadth necessary to serve the public interest as suggested by
Judge Adams. Further, the lawyer will lose the perspective necessary to make a complete analysis of the problem being faced. A
lawyer who represents a debtor today, a creditor tomorrow and a
trustee next week, will be inhibited by this sub-sub-specialization
and required to operate in such a narrow field that the proverbial
"big picture" may be missed.
Thus, not only will the public lose broad perspective but the
practice in any given field will reach a level of specialization that
will require experts in narrow areas of their own expertise.
Needless to say, this specialization may well place the practice
outside the realm of affordability. This may be the ultimate
irony. Firms that need the protection of the Code because they
are losing money or because they have cash flow problems or
because they need intelligent restructuring may not be able to
afford to go bankrupt. For with sub-sub-specialization will come,
as surely as night follows day, a significant increase in hourly
rates. The most important lesson to be learned from this discussion is that lawyers must be candid with one another, candid with
their clients and candid with the courts. They must recognize
when limitations inhibit, rather than encourage, the appropriate
representation of their clients but they must always keep in mind
that they cannot serve the proverbial "two masters" of which
Matthew warned. 4
As Judge Adams put it: "The necessity to develop 'instant
expertise' is particularly troublesome ...as it is inconsistent with

the traditional vision of legal practice as a diverse and liberal endeavor. Excessive specialization inevitably detracts from the rich
and full legacy of the profession."85
The basic tension between the imposition of a narrow perspective required by the rules concerning conflicts and the
truisms stated by judge Adams suggest no easy solution. For the
practitioner caught between the two, it is necessary to bring both
the facts of representation and the need for such representation
to the attention of the court. Because the courts are becoming
more sensitive to the issues discussed above, professionals must
ensure that the requirements set forth for employment and com84

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

85 Adams, supra note 83, at 80.
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pensation of professionals are followed correctly. The most effective way to be certain that the requirements have been met
sufficiently is to analyze the circumstances closely and disclose all
information to the court. If any questions arise concerning the
professional's employment, the best solution is to bring a motion
requesting a hearing before the judge.
Occasionally, counsel is unable to determine at the outset
that there are existing conflicts of interest. One way to deal with
this problem may be to advise the court that all possible checks
have not been made and request a limited period of time to complete the investigation. If such a procedure is allowed, an order
may be entered and the attorney or other professional can be
paid for the limited period, even if later investigation reveals that
the professional cannot serve.
Candor protects against disaster.

